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Schulhofer: Youth Crime—And What Not to Do About It

YOUTH CRIMEAND WHAT NOT TO DO ABOUT IT
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER*

In this comment, after briefly noting the key features of the existing
juvenile justice system, I will describe the radical proposals for change that the
current media attention to juvenile crime is producing. Then I will examine the
picture of juvenile crime that underlies these policy initiatives and identify
several serious misimpressions that are distorting the public debate. Finally, I
will suggest some policies for dealing with youth crime in constructive rather
than destructive ways.
I.

EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES

To place in perspective the current crop of high-visibility political attacks
on juvenile justice, we must take a moment to sketch the main outlines of the
system that now governs our treatment of young offenders. Because state
systems differ from each other in many particulars, my sketch will necessarily
generalize. I omit detailed discussion of qualifications and exceptions. For
present purposes the variations are relatively unimportant because nearly all state
systems share the same central features that recent proposals have targeted for
change.
The current juvenile justice system traces its roots to a reform movement
of the late nineteenth century, when lawyers and social workers recognized the
multiple failures of a legal system that was prosecuting all youthful offenders in
the same criminal court system designed primarily for adults.' The upshot of
these reforms, first enacted in Illinois in 1899 and soon thereafter copied
throughout the country, 2 is a system of criminal justice in three tiers defined by
the offender's age.
In every state, the juvenile court is the only corrections agency authorized
to deal with offenses committed by minors younger than a certain threshold age,
often twelve or thirteen years old. The ordinary criminal court is the only
* Julius Kreeger Professor of Law & Criminology, and Director of the Center for Studies in
Criminal Justice, University of Chicago. I am grateful for the comments of Herschella Conyers,
Tracey Meares and Albert Alschuler, and for the research assistance of David Gossett.
1. See Steven L. Schlossman, Juvenile Justice: History and Philosophy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 961, 962-65 (Sanford Kadish ed., 1983).
2. Id. at 961-64.
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corrections agency authorized to deal with offenders who are over eighteen. For
youths who are between the threshold age and eighteen, juvenile court and adult
court typically exercise concurrent jurisdiction: the alleged offender may be
tried in either juvenile or adult court depending on a variety of circumstances.
The usual approach is to begin with an assumption that the juvenile court is the
proper forum but permit the juvenile court to "waive" its jurisdiction and thus
permit trial in an ordinary criminal court.
The effect of the waiver decision is, first, to replace the somewhat less
formal procedures of juvenile court with the full due process formalities of a
criminal trial. Many of the important due process rights apply in juvenile court
anyway, 3 but there is no constitutional right to jury trial, no matter how serious
the charge, 4 and other trial procedures may be more streamlined than in
comparable criminal trials.
The procedural effects of waiver into adult court almost always benefit the
alleged young offender, but the substantive effects do not. In juvenile court,
after conviction (technically called a determination of "delinquency"), the
offender faces the possibility of probation, other nominally rehabilitative
sanctions, or confinement (also in theory a rehabilitative sanction) in a "reform
school," "training school," or other secure custodial institution. Confinement
may be ordered for a brief or more lengthy period, but at most, convicted
juvenile offenders typically can be confined only until they reach the age of
majority. They are then released from the custodial institution, and typically
their record of misconduct as juveniles remains confidential.
In contrast, when a minor is convicted of a criminal offense in adult court,
he can incur the same sanctions that apply to adults convicted of the same
offense. He not only faces fines or probation for an extended period, but he
may also be incarcerated in an adult prison for any period up to the maximum
authorized for the offense committed. In a murder prosecution, a juvenile also
faces the death penalty, under the same circumstances as an adult. 5
In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, a decision to proceed in adult rather
than juvenile court often requires, in theory or in practice, a prosecutor's motion
for "waiver." But the ultimate decision is typically left to the discretion of the
juvenile court. Statutes and cases provide the juvenile judge few standards for

3. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 374-75 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 65 (1967).
4. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
5. The juvenile offender must be permitted to argue that his youth is a mitigating circumstance,
but there is no constitutional barrier to executing a murderer who was a minor at the time of the
offense. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 303 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 10809 (1982).
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making the decision, other than an obligation to consider an open-ended
checklist of factors such as the seriousness of the crime, the maturity of the
offender, his prospects for rehabilitation, and so forth. 6 Although the "waiver"
decision is entirely discretionary, it carries such serious substantive
consequences for the alleged offender that due process rights are implicated. In
Kent v. United States,7
the Supreme Court indicated that there is a
constitutionally protected right to a hearing on the decision whether to waive the
juvenile into adult court. 8
Though the potential adverse consequence of waiver for the young
offender-the possibility of a much more severe sentence-is relatively obvious,
it is less widely recognized that waiver sometimes has the opposite effect.
When a juvenile is found to have engaged in serious misconduct, the juvenile
court can order him committed to the custody of the juvenile authorities for as
long as that agency deems necessary-until he reaches the age of eighteen or
twenty-one. Juveniles therefore face an essentially indeterminate term, while a
person convicted of the same misconduct in criminal court would often be
sentenced (with or without sentencing guidelines) to a largely determinate period
of confinement. And especially in the case of the youngest among them,
juveniles who stand trial in juvenile court may face longer confinement than
offenders who are tried for identical conduct in adult court. A thirteen-year-old
juvenile convicted of burglary in juvenile court could be held in custody for as
long as eight years, while the typical offender convicted of a similar offense in
adult court might receive a sentence of only two to three years incarceration.
Constitutional imperatives aside, these juvenile and adult court processes
are entirely creatures of state law, and their structure is entirely a matter for
policy determination by the states. Nonetheless, federal law shapes state policy
from behind the scenes. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 19749 established in the Department of Justice an Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) with a charge "to develop a coherent
national planning process, establish priorities, and focus Federal leadership
efforts."' 0 In addition, the Act established four "mandates" that state systems
must respect as a condition of receiving federal funds: states must avoid
institutionalization of "status" offenders (those charged with conduct that is not
criminal when committed by adults); they must insure "sight and sound"

6. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
7. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
8. Technically, Kent held only that such a right should be read into a provision of District of
Columbia law, as a matter of statutory interpretation, but the Court's reasoning rested heavily on
constitutional principles of procedural due process. Id. at 557.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1996).
10. Michael E. Saucier, Birth of a Partnership,JUV. JUST. BULL., Fall/Winter 1995, at 19, 20.
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separation of juvenile and adult offenders when they are confined in the same
custodial facility; they must remove juveniles from adult jails and lock-ups; and
they must reduce disproportionate confinement of minority youth. "
II.

THE FOUR-PRONGED ATTACK ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The current system is now under a four-pronged attack designed to change
the character of criminal justice responses to youth crime. Prong one is a
movement throughout the states to lower the minimum age at which offenders
are eligible to be tried in adult court. Prong one has the effect of expanding the
concurrent jurisdiction of juvenile and adult courts, but it is partly offset by
prong two, a movement to mandate waiver and thus require prosecution as an
adult, in the case of juveniles charged with certain serious crimes. In the past
four years, thirty states have moved to expand the reach of the adult court
system by. reducing the minimum age for prosecution in criminal court and by
2
excluding certain crimes from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
The first two prongs are largely steps being taken at the state level. Prong
three seeks to attack the perceived problem through federal legislation. The
proposed Violent Youth Predator Act of 1996,3 though not enacted in the last
Congress, is likely to be reintroduced in 1997. Under the banner of leaving
states free to set their own policies, it would abolish the four federal mandates.
A particular target here is the federal requirement of segregation of adults from
young offenders who have been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court. Many
state officials consider "sight and sound" separation expensive in short-run (and
short-sighted) budgetary terms. At a time when both the juvenile and adult
offender populations are rapidly growing (and projected to grow even faster),
the flexibility to mix juveniles with the ordinary offender population in adult
prison offers the prospect of quick out-of-pocket savings for hard-pressed
corrections administrators.
Prong four, embodied in another section of the proposed Violent Youth
Predator Act, would abolish the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention and replace it with an Office of Juvenile Crime Control. 4 The shift
in emphasis from justice to crime control nicely captures the prevailing political
mind-set, but it is more than purely symbolic. Though OJJDP is currently
funded at $150 million, Congress would provide $500 million to the new Office
11. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1996). See
supra note 9. For discussion of the mandates and their implementation, see generally Note, Meeting
the Mandates, 2 Juv. JUST. BULL. 25 (1995).
12. See Lisa Stansky, Age of Innocence, A.B.A. J. Nov. 1996, at 60, 61.
13. H.R. 3565, 104th Cong. (1996).
14. See id. § 403.
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of Juvenile Crime Control. Half the funds would be earmarked as incentive
grants for states that require automatic prosecution in adult court, without a
waiver hearing, for juveniles as young as fourteen who are charged with
"serious violent crimes." "5 In order to receive any federal grant money under
the proposed Act, states would have to assure the Department of Justice that all
juveniles aged fourteen and over who commit a serious violent crime will be
prosecuted as adults. 6 The "serious violent crime" category is broadly defined
to include, among other offenses, manslaughter committed under provocation
(such as, for example, a case in which a sexually abused teenaged girl kills her
abusive father 7 ) and all robberies. 18 Other provisions of the bill would
encourage states to impose mandatory minimum sentences for gun-related crimes
and to end confidentiality of juvenile records and proceedings. 9
Though the proposed federal provisions are structured as a grant rather than
as a mandate-a carrot rather than a stick-the content of the new policy plainly
undercuts the pretense that "state autonomy" is the driving philosophical
commitment of the reforms. The goal of the legislation is emphatically not to
eliminate the federal role in shaping policy toward young offenders. Rather, its
goal is to shift the direction of federal efforts from "justice" and "delinquency
prevention" to an avowedly punitive response.
III. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS (AND WHY YOUTH Is NOT ONE OF THEM)

'In this Section, I want to examine the accuracy of the picture of juvenile
crime that underlies these policy initiatives. The principal assumption driving
the shift toward dramatically more punitive approaches is the view that juvenile
crime, already out of control, is destined to get even worse. Newspapers,
magazines and television stories prominently feature the claim, most often
associated with Princeton Professor John Dilulio, that a tidal wave of "superpredators"-270,000 more in the year 2010 than there were in 1990-is about
to overwhelm our inner cities and our justice system resources. 0 A U.S. News

15. Id. § 243. See also Rhonda McMillion, Squaring Off Against Delinquency, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 1996, at 99.
16. Violent Youth Predator Act of 1996, H.R. 3565, § 408 (adding § 242(a)).
17. For an account of such a case, and the tragic consequences of the Indiana provision that
required the 14-year-old girl to be tried and sentenced as an adult, see Fox Butterfield, A FatalFire,
a Girl in Prison, and a Tangle of Justice Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1996, at Al.
18. Violent Youth Predator Act of 1996, H.R. 3565, 104th Cong. § 402.
19. Violent Youth Predator Act of 1996, H.R. 3565, 104th Cong. § 408 (adding §
242(c)(3),(4),(5)).
20. See James Traub, The Criminals of Tomorrow, NEW YoRKER, Nov. 4, 1996, at 50, 52
(noting that Dilulio warns of a coming wave of juvenile "super-predators").

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [1997], Art. 8

440

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

and World Report story, for example, warned of a "ticking demographic time
bomb. 21
Despite the media-hype about an oncoming "tidal wave" of youth violence,
the expected increase in the number of high-risk youths is at worst a small ripple
in the demographic pond. Between 1996 and the year 2010, the number of boys
under the age of eighteen is expected to grow by only 14%.22
More important, our problems-now and in the future-do not stem from
the fact that these individuals are young. Hard as it is to believe, raging male
hormones are not the problem. America assuredly has serious problems that are
fueling our high levels of crime, but the size of our youth population is not one
of them.
Consider that in 1993, Japan's ten million youth aged fifteen to twenty-four
In 1991 (the most recent year for which
committed forty-three homicides.'
comparable data are available), the United States had nineteen million youth in
the crime-prone fifteen to twenty-four age bracket, but the young Americans
committed 6852 homicides.2 4 With twice as many youth, we had almost 160
times as many homicides. Clearly something serious is going on in the United
States; but whatever it may be, it is not simply a result of our having a large
number of naturally aggressive males.
Because Japan is often viewed as a special case, an unusually well-ordered
society, we can gain further perspective by considering data from other countries
as well. Our youth homicide rate, at 36.8 per 100,000,1 is not only ninetytwo times higher than that of Japan,26 but twenty-three times higher than that
of Germany, 27 twenty times higher than that of France, 28 sixteen times higher
than that of Australia,29 and-closest to home-is still more than eleven times
Again, there is something distinctive, and
higher than that of Canada.'

21. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Scary Kids Around the Corner, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec.
4, 1995, at 96.
22. See FranlinE. Zimring, Crying Wolf over Teen Demons, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1996, at
B5.
23. 1994 WHO, WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS ANNOTATED B-341 (1995). For purposes of this
discussion, I use the age-specific victimization rates reported by WHO as a rough surrogate for agespecific rates of offending.
24. Id. at B-33.
25. Id. at B-17.
26. id. at B-33.
27. Id. at B-143.
28. Id. at B-135.
29. Id. at B-321.
30. Id. at B-17.
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distinctively serious, about the American crime problem, but it is not a problem

that we can sensibly blame on demographics.
The problems that America does have, its distinctive problems, are three-a
gun problem, a violence problem, and, above all, a poverty problem. These
three points are far from original. They have been made over and over, but
they are not for that reason less important than the demographic "news" that has
attracted so much sensationalistic media attention.
Our first problem is guns. In no other Western nation are handguns so
widely distributed in the general population and so readily available to young
people. Our second problem is violence. Our overall crime rates, even for
offenses like theft, burglary, robbery, and assault, are not markedly different
from those of countries like Canada and Australia. 3 But our rates for the most
violent offenses-gun robberies, rapes and homicides-are radically different and
orders of magnitude higher.32 Finally, our third and most serious problem is
poverty. The United States, one of the wealthiest nations in the world, lives
with levels of poverty that dwarf those of other Western nations. Twenty-two
percent of our children are raised in poverty, a figure that is the highest in the
developed world.33 The proportion of our population raised in poverty is two
to nine times higher than in the other seventeen major industrial nations.'
IV.

MISGUIDED POLICY RESPONSES

A more nuanced understanding of the causes of America's crime
predicament is not necessarily decisive for the policy debate. Whether our highrisk kids are violent because they are young or because they are poor, it is still
true that too many of them are unmanageable and violent. Whatever the cause,
we still have to do something about their behavior. And in some cases, the only
appropriate response is custodial confinement for an extended period. That
obvious point has always been accepted in juvenile justice administration, and
must be stressed at the outset. But the across-the-board, categorically punitive
31. See generally JAN J.M. VAN DIJK ET AL., EXPERIENCES OF CRIME ACROSS THE WORLD
(1990).
32. Id. See also Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Violence Is Not a Crime Problem,
Jan. 12, 1994 (unpublished paper, on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).
33. LEE RAINWATER & TIMOTHY M. SMEEDLING, DOING POORLY: THE REAL INCOME OF
AMERICAN CHILDREN IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPEuIVE 10-13, fig.4 & tbl.3 (Lux. Income Stud.
Working Paper No. 127, 1995).
34. Id. Compounding the effects of high poverty levels are the high levels of social
disorganization that contribute to high crime rates in many inner city neighborhoods. See Robert
J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social Disorganization
Theory, 94 AM. J. Soc. 774 (1989).
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approach favored in the current climate of public opinion suffers from two major
problems.
First, if the goal is a more punitive response-or just the more modest,
uncontroversial goal of assuring that problem children get attention rather than
slipping through the cracks-then shifting young offenders from juvenile to adult
court is an illusory solution. It is certainly true that too many juvenile-court
systems are understaffed, underfinanced, poorly managed, and overwhelmed by
daunting caseloads. But reformers who believe they can escape these problems
by moving cases into adult court cannot have looked very closely at the
alternative they are proposing.
The criminal courts have exactly the same weaknesses as the juvenile-court
system that reformers want to displace. In many jurisdictions overload and
administrative problems of the criminal-court system dwarf those of the juvenilecourt counterparts. What is worse, adult-court personnel are understandably
absorbed in processing seriously violent, repeat offenders. Older teenagers who
commit murder or rape are rarely ignored, and they will indeed get a harsher
sentence in criminal court than they would face in a juvenile proceeding. But
many teens charged with fighting ("assault") or lower-level robberies will get
even less attention in adult court than they would in juvenile court.
The second problem arises when the shift from juvenile to adult court
succeeds in producing more severe punishment. Sometimes that is the right
approach. A long period of custodial confinement is the only prudent or
tolerable response to some of the violent offenses that teenagers commit. It is
precisely the point of the traditional system's waiver hearing to identify such
cases by careful examination of the circumstances, and then to direct such cases
to criminal court. But when blanket policies mandate automatic adult-court
prosecution for whole categories of criminal conduct defined broadly in advance,
the mandates divert enormous numbers of new cases into the criminal-court
system. That step, combined with the strict sentencing policies applicable in
adult court, means sweeping large numbers of new inmates into our adult prison
system. Thus, the second major problem with current policy proposals is that
huge costs will attend this hoped-for addition to our already burgeoning prison
population.
The numbers are daunting. In 1994 juveniles aged ten to seventeen
accounted for 150,000 arrests for violent crime.35 Only 6% of these arrests
were for murder or rape, the offenses most often directed to adult court when

35. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1996 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 10 (1996).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss2/8

Schulhofer: Youth Crime—And What Not to Do About It

1997] YOUTH CRIME-WHAT NOT TO DO ABOUT IT

443

waiver is selective.'
There were over 140,000 arrests for the other major
crimes of violence (robbery and aggravated assault) and an additional 63,000
arrests for weapons-law violations not included in the "violent crime"
category. 37 Juveniles currently account for 16% of all arrests for aggravated
assault, 24% of all arrests for weapons-law violations, and 32% of all robbery
arrests.38 Yet less than 2% of the juvenile arrestees are currently waived into
adult court-just 5000 juveniles charged with violent crimes and less than 7000
juveniles for all other offenses combined. 39 The remaining 97-98% of the
cases, including more than 145,000 cases in the violent-crime category and
62,000 weapons cases each year, are currently tried in juvenile court and are
subject only to the sanctions of the juvenile corrections process. To shift all
these cases, or any significant sub-sets of them, into adult court, where
sentencing standards are often both severe and inflexible (and getting more so)
will mean very sizable, very costly increases in prison populations and in the
number of years of time served.
Of course, it is precisely the intent of the new punitive policies to produce
just this growth in the use of custodial confinement. The added expense is
intended, and many taxpayers seem almost willing to foot the huge (though
rarely well-specified) bill. Problem number two is not simply that the number
of offenses affected is near-astronomical and that the associated costs are
appallingly high. Our crime problem is serious, and it will not be solved
cheaply. The relevant objection to the current wave of categorically punitive
proposals is not just that their costs will be enormous but that most of the
expenditure will be utterly wasted.
Broad, automatically punitive responses are wasteful for two reasonslumping and aging. The lumping problem is that "violent crime" is an
extremely wide, heterogeneous category. To say that is not to condone violent
crime of any sort. All violent crime is serious and deserves a serious response.
But murders account for only 2% of the violent crimes committed by juveniles;
the drive-by shootings and other brutal crimes featured on the nightly news are
a very small portion of the violent-crime totals. The lower-level cases-kids
caught with knives, kids involved in serious fist fights ("aggravated assault"),
kids who snatch purses, gold chains or athletic jackets from other kids
("robbery")-certainly need a serious response, often the measured, constructive
response that the juvenile court system at its best can give. Offenders of this
sort do not necessarily need to spend several years in state prison.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 13.
Id.at 28.
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Aging is the second reason why automatically punitive responses can be
wasteful and unnecessary. Misbehavior by adolescents and pre-adolescents often
simply disappears as the kids grow up. The aging phenomenon applies even to
much of the misbehavior that we properly treat as "violent crime"-again, the
purse-snatchings, fist fights, and so on. A good deal of this misbehavior will
not be deterred by the prospect of criminal punishment (adolescents are known
for disregarding-and even seeking out-far more serious risks), and often the
misbehavior will not be repeated even if adult authorities decline to respond in
the harshest possible way. Yet thousands of such situations will fall subject to
the automatically punitive policies now proposed for broad violent crime
categories like "robbery."
For most of these cases, expensive custodial
sentences are an utter waste of scarce resources.
And not just a waste. The categorically punitive proposals are not only
needlessly expensive but dangerously counterproductive. Give a twenty-sixyear-old robber a ten-year sentence, and he returns to the streets at age thirtysix, well past his prime years for predatory offending. But sentence a fourteenyear-old to ten years in state prison for a purse snatching, and you are almost
guaranteeing that he will spend his formative years in an environment with no
affection, no positive role models, and no useful education other than an intense
immersion in the ways of crime and brutality. At the end of his sentence, you
will be sending back to the streets a twenty-four-year-old hardened criminal at
the peak of his potential for predatory violence. An enterprise that is destined
to produce these sorts of results does not seem the best possible use of scarce
public resources.
V.

SENSIBLE RESPONSES

A constructive and efficient approach to youth crime should include three
elements-targeting, diverting and a front-end focus. Targeting means that
within the justice and correctional systems, severely punitive sanctions must be
used sparingly and selectively.
Brutal murderers need secure custodial
;onfinement. Some juveniles are offenders of just this sort, but there are not
many of them. And despite sensationalistic media coverage of these dangerous
youths, the court systems are not now ignoring them or setting them free with
just a slap on the wrist. Long incarceration, however necessary for some cases,
must not be reflexively inflicted across-the-board on the tens of thousands of
young people whose crimes of violence and weapons offenses consist of no more
than fighting, petty robbery, or bringing a knife or a gun to school for selfprotection.
Diverting means that whenever possible, serious offenders are channeled
to constructive programs of preventive education and treatment rather than to
custodial confinement. A recent OJJPD Report notes that "[d]iversion and
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treatment programs provide some of the most promising examples of violence
prevention techniques that work with youth involved in gun violence." 4'
Successful (though rarely publicized) diversion programs now exist throughout
the country. In Arizona and Indiana, youths caught carrying a gun can, if they
are not hard-core delinquents, avoid prosecution by agreeing to take a carefully
structured firearms-prevention course run by educators and state prosecutors. 4'
In Boston, students found carrying weapons on school grounds are referred for
academic, psychological and social evaluation to a counseling center run by the
public school system.42 In Missouri and Kansas, school systems that have a
zero-tolerance policy for gun possession have set up alternative schools so that
teenagers caught carrying weapons are swiftly sanctioned with suspension,
combined with a transfer for continued schooling at a location away from their
home school. 43 Unfortunately, programs like these remain few in number and
small in scale. They urgently need the resources that increasingly are being
drained away to support massive increases in incarceration.
The third major idea is front-end focus, an emphasis on prevention
programs that target high-risk youth before they commit crimes. The largest
pay-offs typically come from prevention efforts directed upstream, at the early
stages of youth development-the earlier the better. This means graduation
incentives for high-school and middle-school students, smaller classrooms in the
upper grades and in primary school, as well as generous expansion of successful
pre-school programs like Head Start. All these are familiar, old ideas, and
supposedly "everyone knows" that we cannot afford them. At an average cost
of $4500 per pupil per year," Head Start is not cheap. But the data show with
reasonable confidence that such programs easily pay for themselves in improved
educational outcomes along with their crime prevention benefits.45
Assessments of pre-school programs for disadvantaged children sometimes
conclude that their early gains disappear by the third or fourth grade,' and

40. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
REDUCING YOUTH GUN VIOLENCE: AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAMS AND INmATIVES 17 (1996)

[hereinafter OVERVIEW]. For notes of caution about the implementation of diversion programs, see
Paul Nejelski, Diversion: Unleashing the Hound of Heaven?, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD
94-118 (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1976).
41. OVERVIEW, supra note 40, at 17-18.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 19.
44. Head Start Statistical Fact Sheet (visited May 10, 1996) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/
programs/hsb/statfact.htm> (average cost per child for fiscal year 1995 was $4534). See also
LISBETH B. SCHORR, WITHIN OUR REACH 272 (1988) (reporting that the Perry Preschool program
cost $5000 per pupil per year).
45. See, e.g., SCHORR, supra note 44, at 195-97, 272.
46. Id.at 195-96, 336.
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these findings have often been used to discredit such programs. But assessments
over longer periods have consistently found enduring positive effects. An
evaluation of the Perry Preschool program found that "at the age of nineteen,
twice as many program participants as control children were employed,
attending college, or receiving further training. Their high school graduation
rate was one third higher, their arrest rates 40 % lower, and their teen pregnancy
rates 42% lower." 47 "In the most extensive investigation ever undertaken of
the long-term effects of preschool education, "48 the Consortium for
Longitudinal Studies, a combined evaluation effort by a number of research
universities, likewise found that the achievement slump at the third and fourth
49
grades was temporary and that long-term positive effects were substantial.
Yet a society that is willing to pay from $25,000 to $50,000 per juvenile per
year for custodial confinement cannot-so we are told-afford a mere $4500 per
pupil per year for Head Start.
The front-end focus should turn our attention even further upstream, to
nutrition and health care programs for youngsters and even to pre-natal care for
pregnant women in high-risk poverty environments. The data again are
reasonably clear that inadequate health care during pregnancy and early
childhood are associated with low birth weight and a variety of health problems
in infancy.' Increased incidence of such simple problems as ear infection lead
in short order to increased incidence of mild hearing loss, followed in turn by
early frustration in school and, as early as the third or fourth grade, signs of
attention deficit, learning difficulty, aggression and delinquency."'
The bottom line is that talk of waging "war" on crime focuses attention in
the wrong way on the wrong part of the problem. If the "war" metaphor is
appropriate at all, we should not be throwing all our troops and all our resources
into a near-futile effort to respond to the symptoms of the last stages of
delinquency-a part of the battlefield where our "enemy" is already deeply
entrenched on ground that we can take only by a costly uphill struggle. What
we need instead is an all-out assault on the front-end, a new "war on poverty,"
one that this time will be sustained through long-term efforts to improve job
opportunity, education, and health care.
Even further upstream, and probably even more important than pre-natal
care, is the concentrated housing that breeds violence and other social
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pathologies for the urban poor.12 A vigorous program of decentralized housing
for low-income families might even emphasize vouchers for rental in the private
market, rather than "scattered sites" for smaller-scale public projects that
continue to house underclass residents exclusively. A thoroughly decentralized
program could bring rates of offending for young underclass males down to
those of middle-class whites within the brief span of a single generation. 3
Such a step could have more impact on overall crime rates than all the expensive
new deterrence and incapacitation programs combined.
My time-frame may not be fast enough to suit political leaders focused on
the next election cycle. But targeting, diverting, and a front-end focus offer
proportionate, just sanctions and the prospect of tangible crime-control solutions
within our lifetimes. That is more than can be said for the current crop of
categorically punitive proposals that are politically appealing but needlessly harsh
and dangerously counterproductive.

52. See Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away With Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime in
Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1203 (1995); Sampson & Groves, supra note 34.
53. For a discussion of generally successful outcomes from efforts to deconcentrate the urban
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